Flood attack 0.00000001 BC
hi, what would happen if someone sends millions of 0.00000001 BC to millions of address please ?
=> all of the networks peers must store all transactions ? => are each 0.00000001 owner/hash stocked in blocks on all peers?
i don’t really understand how bitcoin handle fractions of bc
Well, right now nothing stops someone from creating a system where:
A sends 1.00000001 to B B sends 1.00000000 back to A
Net result is a micro-payment and no processing fee. I am creating a system that does something very similar to the above. The reality is that any “micro-payment” system should probably be handled outside the BTC block and have the payments “summed up” before being sent.
I think the processing fee design is brilliant. Every node can pick and choose which transactions it wants to include and thus the “time until included” is directly proportional to the number of nodes who accept your “offer”. Worst case you have to wait until your lonely PC can create a block which at the moment could be weeks!
In fact, I think it would be reasonable to offer to pay the nodes that propagate your transaction if there was some way to “enforce it” and prevent rouge clients from collecting fees but not doing work.
Quote from: bytemaster on August 04, 2010, 06:22:56 AM
Well, right now nothing stops someone from creating a system where:
A sends 1.00000001 to B B sends 1.00000000 back to A
Net result is a micro-payment and no processing fee.
… unless B started with zero bitcoins. Then B is stuck; she can’t send 1.0 back, because doing that would cause a 0.00000001 bitcoin ‘change’ transaction, which would trigger the 0.01BTC fee, which they can’t pay (because they only have 1.0000000001).
What exactly is this ‘dust spam’ that this 0.01BTC transaction fee “solving”? It seems to do more harm than good because it prevents micropayment implementations such as the one bytemaster is suggesting.
I’m not aware that the network is straining under the weight of the existing transaction volume. Anyone wishing to send a lot of transactions can already do this by sending x BTC to themselves a lot.
Quote from: Insti on August 04, 2010, 02:58:31 PM
What exactly is this ‘dust spam’ that this 0.01BTC transaction fee “solving”? It seems to do more harm than good because it prevents micropayment implementations such as the one bytemaster is suggesting.
I’m not aware that the network is straining under the weight of the existing transaction volume. Anyone wishing to send a lot of transactions can already do this by sending x BTC to themselves a lot.
Someone with only one Bitcoin could send 100,000,000 transactions, which might overload the network. This isn’t a good solution, though — the vulnerability will still exist when the limit is lowered because someone will certainly be saving a bunch of Bitcoins.
A better solution would be to deprioritize transactions below 0.01 and completely drop them if there are more than 10,000 (or whatever) in the queue. Then these transactions would be slower and less reliable than other transactions, but they would work and not interfere with “real” transactions.
priority is all contingent upon how many nodes accept them. Thus if only 1% of the nodes accept a transaction fee of 0.000001 btc then you will have a 1% chance of being included in the next block. If all nodes accept transaction fees of 1BTC then you have near 100% chance of being in the next block.
Quote from: theymos on August 04, 2010, 03:43:56 PM
Quote from: Insti on August 04, 2010, 02:58:31 PM
What exactly is this ‘dust spam’ that this 0.01BTC transaction fee “solving”?
Someone with only one Bitcoin could send 100,000,000 transactions, which might overload the network. This isn’t a good solution, though — the vulnerability will still exist when the limit is lowered because someone will certainly be saving a bunch of Bitcoins.
Someone with one Bitcoin can already send 100,000,000 transactions, by repeatedly sending the coin to themselves. How is it any different if the value of the transaction is 1 or 0.00000001 ?
Quote from: Insti on August 04, 2010, 02:58:31 PM
It seems to do more harm than good because it prevents micropayment implementations such as the one bytemaster is suggesting.Bitcoin isn’t currently practical for very small micropayments. Not for things like pay per search or per page view without an aggregating mechanism, not things needing to pay less than 0.01. The dust spam limit is a first try at intentionally trying to prevent overly small micropayments like that.
Bitcoin is practical for smaller transactions than are practical with existing payment methods. Small enough to include what you might call the top of the micropayment range. But it doesn’t claim to be practical for arbitrarily small micropayments.
Can the fee rules be arbitrarily complicated? And is the size limit hard wired or completely up to the node?
Does including more slow down your hashing rate?
Quote from: gavinandresen on August 04, 2010, 11:58:58 AM
Quote from: bytemaster on August 04, 2010, 06:22:56 AM
Well, right now nothing stops someone from creating a system where:
A sends 1.00000001 to B B sends 1.00000000 back to A
Net result is a micro-payment and no processing fee.
… unless B started with zero bitcoins. Then B is stuck; she can’t send 1.0 back, because doing that would cause a 0.00000001 bitcoin ‘change’ transaction, which would trigger the 0.01BTC fee, which they can’t pay (because they only have 1.0000000001).
ok if a and b both start out with 1 BTC and agree to transfer 0.0001 using two inputs and two outputs on a single transaction can change a to 0.9999 and b to 1.0001. The rest of the network it would seem would accept the transaction.
The only stumbling block is whoever creates the transaction needs the private keys for both inputs which would come from different wallets normally. The one who creates the transaction could cheat.
Quote from: satoshi on August 04, 2010, 04:25:36 PM
Bitcoin isn’t currently practical for very small micropayments. Not for things like pay per search or per page view without an aggregating mechanism, not things needing to pay less than 0.01. The dust spam limit is a first try at intentionally trying to prevent overly small micropayments like that.
Bitcoin is practical for smaller transactions than are practical with existing payment methods. Small enough to include what you might call the top of the micropayment range. But it doesn’t claim to be practical for arbitrarily small micropayments.
Why isn’t it practical? I agree that a good micropayment system would avoid generating thousands of transactions (e.g. one per packet), but that doesn’t mean that bytemaster’s change idea is wrong: That seems like a great use case. Furthermore, as llama said, the fixed component of a transaction fee should always represent the real cost of including that transaction in a block. So, are there any more intelligent and less painful ways of implementing anti-dust spam systems?
I think the current system works fine. If someone wants to implement a micro-payment system then they will have to host enough nodes and contribute enough processing power to include their small transactions. I see no reason to require any node to accept or forward micro-payment transactions if said nodes does not wish to.
The real issue is that even a simple legitimate automated micro-payment system could overload bitcoin by introducing more transactions than the credit card system currently uses. The net result is that block sizes could become HUGE.
In my use case you have a P2P system where they pay for priority downloads. Assume you have a single “torrent” file with 100,000 people all seeding and downloading. That could easily generate 100,000 micro-payments per minute. Now clearly, the program would only have to use BTC in the event that upload != download between two clients.
It would be distributed and thus there would be no easy way to identify “spam” from legitimate usage. Even using my solution of transferring 1+ BTC at a time and giving change if the balance is greater than 0.01 could cause a transaction bloat writ large.
I suspect that the “cost” of handing individual transactions may be low (.00001 BTC) but the cost of handling ALL of those little transactions from millions of users using automated payment negotiation/bidding systems would quickly make it impossible to even listen for all incoming transactions.
The only solution to this problem is to make broadcasting of a transaction “non free”. Namely, if you want me to include it you have to pay me. The net (no pun intended) result is that each client would need to pay other clients to whom they even send their transaction, not just the individual who gets it in a block. In this way the laws of economics take over and no one gets a free ride on the transaction broadcast system.
The implication is that you may not even receive notice of payment until a node that you paid to receive your transaction and attempt to integrate it into a block manages to do so. This means that you would not even see 0/unconfirmed and that a transaction must make it into a block before anyone that wasn’t paid to attempt to integrate it even knows it exists.
This structure would encourage pay-to-ip systems because that make the receiver of the payment responsible for paying to get it integrated. Either they run their own bitcoin generators or they pay to send the transaction to someone who is.
Forgot to add the good part about micropayments. While I don’t think Bitcoin is practical for smaller micropayments right now, it will eventually be as storage and bandwidth costs continue to fall. If Bitcoin catches on on a big scale, it may already be the case by that time. Another way they can become more practical is if I implement client-only mode and the number of network nodes consolidates into a smaller number of professional server farms. Whatever size micropayments you need will eventually be practical. I think in 5 or 10 years, the bandwidth and storage will seem trivial.
I am not claiming that the network is impervious to DoS attack. I think most P2P networks can be DoS attacked in numerous ways. (On a side note, I read that the record companies would like to DoS all the file sharing networks, but they don’t want to break the anti-hacking/anti-abuse laws.)
If we started getting DoS attacked with loads of wasted transactions back and forth, you would need to start paying a 0.01 minimum transaction fee. 0.1.5 actually had an option to set that, but I took it out to reduce confusion. Free transactions are nice and we can keep it that way if people don’t abuse them.
That brings up the question: if there was a minimum 0.01 fee for each transaction, should we automatically add the fee if it’s just the minimum 0.01? It would be awfully annoying to ask each time. If you have 50.00 and send 10.00, the recipient would get 10.00 and you’d have 39.99 left. I think it should just add it automatically. It’s trivial compared to the fees many other types of services add automatically.
Quote from: FreeMoney on August 04, 2010, 07:30:32 PM
Does including more slow down your hashing rate?
No, not at all.
Quote from: bytemasterPayments would generally be advanced, say 1 BTC at a time and when the connection closes any “change” would be returned. This rule makes it impossible to pay for a simple “search query” with no further transactions. One alternative is to use a round-up system. You pay for, say, 1000 pages or images or downloads or searches or whatever at a time. When you’ve used up your 1000 pages, you pay for another 1000 pages. If you only use 1 page, then you have 999 left that you may never use, but it’s not a big deal because the cost per 1000 is still small.
Or you could pay per day. The first time you access the site on a given day, you pay for 24 hours of access.
Per 1000 or per day may be easier for consumers to get their heads around too. They worry about per item because it’s harder to figure if it might add up too fast. Unlimited for 24 hours they know what the cost will be. Or if 1000 seems like plenty, they’re not worrying that it’s costing more with each click if they figure 1000 is more than they’ll probably use.
Quote from: bytemaster on August 05, 2010, 03:39:19 PM
The only solution to this problem is to make broadcasting of a transaction “non free”. Namely, if you want me to include it you have to pay me. The net (no pun intended) result is that each client would need to pay other clients to whom they even send their transaction, not just the individual who gets it in a block. In this way the laws of economics take over and no one gets a free ride on the transaction broadcast system.
I don’t know a way to implement that. The transaction fee to the block creator uses a special trick to include the transaction fee without any additional size. If there was a transaction for each transaction fee, then what about the transactions fees for the transaction fee’s transaction?
Quote from: satoshi on August 05, 2010, 04:39:58 PM
If there was a transaction for each transaction fee, then what about the transactions fees for the transaction fee’s transaction?
The transaction fee transaction would be designed to be a completely predictable consequence of the main transaction and hopefully any fee for processing the main transaction would also take into account the need for a fee transaction too. In other words the fee transaction would contain its own fee. This therefore seems to be a manageable aspect of the problem.
ByteCoin
Right now the transaction fee address is left “blank” and the block generator fills it out. Now you would fill it in with the address of the person you are asking to build the block.
If the transmit fee <= block integration fee no one could profitably forward the transaction and thus must generate a block themselves.
Quote from: bytemaster on August 05, 2010, 04:46:52 PM
Right now the transaction fee address is left “blank” and the block generator fills it out.
Now you would fill it in with the address of the person you are asking to build the block. If you’re only going to have one person work on building the block, that could take days. Oh, do you mean send a different variation to each node with the tx fee written to them?
The way it is now, it’s whoever builds this gets it.
If we needed to, we could have a BitTorrent-esque tit-for-tat for transaction broadcast. Relay paying transactions to me, or I won’t relay them to you. It probably won’t be an actual problem though. It only takes one node relaying like it should to cancel out 7 others greedily not relaying.
Does that mean, that my abilities to DDoS the entire Bitcoin network are only limited by my BTC bying power? And not by the number of my network connections, nodes, etc?
BTW, let’s test the network someday? It is trivial to automate the process of sending small transactions to the list of known addresses. Let’s abuse the network and know the effect precisely.
I suppose, we should caution the other users…
Quote from: throughput on August 10, 2010, 10:13:30 AM
BTW, let’s test the network someday? It is trivial to automate the process of sending small transactions to the list of known addresses. Let’s abuse the network and know the effect precisely.
I suppose, we should caution the other users…
You should use the Test network
Quote from: Insti on August 10, 2010, 02:53:41 PM
Quote from: throughput on August 10, 2010, 10:13:30 AM
BTW, let’s test the network someday? It is trivial to automate the process of sending small transactions to the list of known addresses. Let’s abuse the network and know the effect precisely.
I suppose, we should caution the other users…
You should use the Test network
Test network have test scale.
Hmm, I think the other guys may not ask your permission to abuse the real network next time. They will just do it.
I’m sure, the Bitcoin is useless if it is vulnerable to such a simple intrusion. We should prove, that it is sustainable to real world threats. Like me Grin
Perhaps somebody just experimented already?
It would be nice to keep the blk*.dat files small as long as we can.
The eventual solution will be to not care how big it gets.
But for now, while it’s still small, it’s nice to keep it small so new users can get going faster. When I eventually implement client-only mode, that won’t matter much anymore.
There’s more work to do on transaction fees. In the event of a flood, you would still be able to jump the queue and get your transactions into the next block by paying a 0.01 transaction fee. However, I haven’t had time yet to add that option to the UI.
Scale or not, the test network will react in the same ways, but with much less wasted bandwidth and annoyance.